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Phase-change Random Access Memory (PRAM) is an emerging memory technology for future computing systems. It is non-
volatile and has a faster read latency and potentially higher storage density than other memory alternatives. Recently, system
researchers have studied the trade-off of using PRAM to back up a DRAM cache as a last level memory or to implement it in a
hybrid memory architecture. The main roadblock preventing PRAM from commercially viable, however, is its much lower write
endurance. Several recent proposals attempted to address this issue by either reducing PRAM’s write frequency or using wear-
leveling techniques to evenly distribute PRAM writes. Although the lifetime of PRAM could be extended by these techniques under
normal operations of typical applications, most of them do not prevent a malicious code deliberately designed to wear it out.
Furthermore, all of these prior techniques failed to consider the circumstances when a compromised OS is present and its security
implication to the overall PRAM design. A compromised OS, (e.g., via simple buffer overflow) will allow adversaries to manipulate
all processes and exploit side channels easily, accelerating the wear-out of targeted PRAM blocks and rendering a dysfunctional
system.
In this paper, we argue that a PRAM design not only has to consider normal wear-out under conventional application behavior,
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most importantly, it must take the worst-case scenario into account with the presence of malicious exploits and a compromised
OS. Such design consideration will address both the durability and security issues of PRAM simultaneously. Toward this goal, in
this work, we propose a novel, low-cost hardware mechanism called Security Refresh. Similar to the concept of protecting charge
leak from DRAM, Security Refresh prevents information leak by constantly migrating its physical location (thus refresh) inside
PRAM, obfuscating the actual data placement from users and system software. It uses a dynamic randomized address mapping
scheme, which swaps data between random PRAM blocks using random keys generated by thermal noise upon each refresh due.
The hardware is extremely low-cost without using any table. We presented two implementation alternatives and showed their trade-
off and respective wear-out endurance. For a given configuration, we show that the optimal lifetime of a PRAM block (256B) is 8
years. In addition, we showed the performance impact of Security Refresh is mostly negligible.
1 Introduction
Phase-change Random Access Memory (PRAM) has emerged as one potential memory technology for improving the performance
of the overall system memory hierarchy. A PRAM cell is made of phase-change material based on chalcogenide alloy, which is
typically composed of Ge, Sb, and Te. The material has two distinct phases — a high electrical resistive amorphous phase and a
low resistive crystalline phase. The crystalline phase can be reached by heating the material above the crystallization temperature
while it can be switched into the amorphous phase by melting and quickly quenching it. A data bit can be stored in either states,
which are non-volatile. Compared to flash memory devices, PRAM can have much shorter latency and longer write endurance.
These advantages make it a perfect candidate as the alternative to flash memory devices. On the other hand, the density of current
PRAM is higher than that of DRAM. Moreover, if we can utilize its multi-bit feature per cell which provides two additional partial
crystalline states, the density can be even greater, up to two to four times higher than DRAM. Recently, researchers have studied
the trade-off of using PRAM as the main memory or even as the last level cache. Although its latency is currently several times
longer than DRAM latency, these studies showed that the benefits from its density can outweigh the degradation of access time by
employing a deeper memory hierarchy [14] or having a hybrid memory architecture with other memory technologies [13, 20].
The main roadblock preventing PRAM from commercially viable, however, is its much shorter write endurance than DRAM.
The current write endurance of a PRAM cell is around 108 although the number is projected to be increased to 1015 in 2022
according to the projection of ITRS [1]. Several recent studies attempted to address this issue by either reducing PRAM’s write
frequency or using wear-leveling techniques to evenly distribute PRAM writes. Although the lifetime of PRAM could be extended
by these techniques under normal operations of typical applications, we found that most of them fail to prevent an adversary from
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writing malicious codes deliberately designed to wear out and fail PRAM. For instance, the schemes to reducing write frequency,
such as data comparison write [21] and Flip-N-Write [3], contain predictable access patterns, thus an adversary can easily concoct
a way to exploit their properties and wear out PRAM. The prior wear-leveling schemes are also vulnerable due to the inherent
weaknesses caused by static randomization, coarse-grained shuffling, and regular shuffling pattern as we will show in the paper.
Furthermore, all the prior art did not consider the circumstances when the underlying OS can be compromised and its security
implication to PRAM design. A compromised OS, (e.g., via simple buffer overflow) will allow adversaries to manipulate all
processes and exploit side channels easily, which accelerates the wear-out of targeted PRAM blocks and render a dysfunctional
system. For example, a compromised OS can thrash or turn off all caches, disabling the shield from PRAM. Moreover, if the
compromised OS allows a malicious process to obtain and assembly useful information leaked from side channels (e.g., timing
attacks [6, 18] to deduce shuffling pattern in a wear-leveling scheme), the wear-leveling scheme will not stop adversaries from
tracking, pinpointing, and wearing out target PRAM blocks. Note that, attacking a system using side channels using time [6, 18],
power [7], electromagnetic emission [2], architectural vulnerability [16, 23], etc., have been successfully demonstrated in many
systems including the Xbox [4]. Designing PRAM without careful consideration for all these implications will lead to critical data
loss in PRAM, rendering incorrect computing or transaction results, eventually leading to dire financial consequences.
In this paper, we argue that PRAM designs not only have to consider wear-out under normal execution of typical applications,
most importantly, they must take the worst-case scenarios into account with the presence of malicious exploits and a compromised
OS. Such design consideration will address durability and security issues of a PRAM system simultaneously. After demonstrating
attack models that exploit the weakness of prior works and analyzing how long they can sustain such attacks, we will show
that dynamic runtime randomization with low-cost hardware implementation are required for ensuring security and preventing
construction of useful knowledge gleaned from side channels. To achieve this goal, in this work, we propose Security Refresh.
Similar to the concept of protecting charge leak from DRAM, Security Refresh, a low-cost hardware embedded inside PRAM,
prevents information leak by constantly migrating physical locations of PRAM data (thus refresh), obfuscating the actual data
placement from users and system software. The contributions of our paper are :
• We demonstrate that security is a separate yet more serious issue from simply extending durability in PRAM design.
• We analyze the vulnerability of prior studies and provide their respective, practical attack models to wear out PRAM within a
reasonable amount of time.
• We propose a dynamic, low-cost wear-leveling scheme called Security Refresh to battle intentional, malicious wear-out and
present the implementation trade-off from the security and durability standpoint.
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Figure 1: The Addressing Scheme of the Baseline Architecture
• We analyze our schemes with both analytical models and simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior works and their vulnerabilities with our step-by-step
attack methods. Section 3 introduces our Security Refresh technique. Section 4 discusses the trade-off of different implementations.
Section 5 evaluates the wear-leveling and the performance impact of the two-level Security Refresh. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Vulnerability of Prior Wear-out Management Schemes
Recently, several architectural techniques were proposed to prolong the limited write endurance of PRAM. They can be classified
into two groups: the methods to eliminating redundant writes [3, 8, 13, 21, 22] and the ones to evenly wearing out the entire
memory space [13, 14, 22]. In our analysis, we evaluate their vulnerabilities using a baseline architecture similar to the one used in
a recent study [14]. Basically, we assume that an off-chip DRAM is used as a last-level SRAM-like cache backed up with PRAM
used as the actual system main memory. The interface between the DRAM cache and PRAM is a DDR3-1600 like 64-bit bus. The
16GB PRAM consists of four ranks while each rank contains four banks with 32K rows in each bank. Its write endurance is 108.
The PRAM read and write latencies are 150ns and 450ns, respectively.
To clarify the terminology used in this paper, Figure 1 depicts the layers of address translation and mapping from virtual address
all the way down to the low level physical memory location. Note that a memory controller usually maps a given physical address
(PA) into a memory address (MA) that consists of a rank ID, a bank ID, a row address, and a column address for indexing the
main memory. In the following discussion, we also assume that a memory controller interleaves consecutive row addresses across
different banks, a common mechanism to enhance bank-level parallelism.
2.1 Vulnerability of Systems Without Protection
The simplest way to attack a durability-oblivious PRAM is to repeatedly write to a fixed location. To force cache misses for PRAM
accesses, it is obvious that one can deliberately cook up a program that continuously write to nine different addresses mapped to
the same set of the 8-way cache with s sets in our baseline. The first eight instructions inside a loop sequentially write to a[i],
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a[i+1*s], to a[i+7*s] filling up one cache set followed by the subsequent eight instructions write to a[i] to a[i+6*s]
and then to a[i+7*b*s], where b is a large value to guarantee a[i+7*s] and a[i+7*b*s] do not hit in the same memory
page (i.e., row buffer hit) but located in the same PRAM bank. After these two write sequences (16 writes) in the loop, we perform
a memory fence operation to ensure addresses will not collapse in an internal buffer but go to external memory directly. As such,
this simple code will generate conflict misses between a[i+7*s] and a[i+7*b*s] and create two row buffer misses all the
time to update two different PRAM locations.
In this attack model, it takes at least 2 × (lw + lr) seconds to write two separate cache lines into PRAM including the time
(lw) to bring two lines into the cache and the time (lr) to write two dirty lines back to PRAM. Given a modern PRAM cell can
endure no more than 108 writes, the lifetime of the baseline PRAM without any architectural durability enhancement will be
2 × (lw + lr) × 10
8, i.e., about two minutes (= 2 × (450ns+ 150ns) × 108).
2.2 Vulnerability of Prior Redundant Write Reduction Schemes
We now examine the prior redundant write reduction schemes. To eliminate redundant writes, Lee et al. [8] and Qureshi et al. [13]
proposed to maintain fine-grained dirty bits as a part of the cache line state to enable partial writes. These methods require additional
partial dirty bits across all cache hierarchy. On the other hand, Yang et al. [21] and Zhou et al. [22] proposed data comparison
and write schemes, which replace a write operation with a read-compare-write operation to eliminate silent stores [9] to PRAM.
Unfortunately, these methods still suffer from the same types of malicious wear-out attacks in Section 2.1 as an adversary can
always write complementary values to the same PRAM cells.
More recently, Cho and Lee [3] leveraged the bus-invert coding idea [17] and proposed to add a single bit per PRAM word to
indicate if a stored word is inverted or not. With this additional state bit, a PRAM chip can write data in an inverted form if the
inverted value reduces the number of bit-flips when storing new data. However, this method is still subject to malicious attacks. For
example, an attacker can use the same malicious program but repeatedly write to 0x00 and 0x01 in turn, which will never enables
the Flip-N-Write feature and eventually wearing out a bit in each byte. In summary, the lifetime of a target location in PRAM in
these systems will still be two minutes.
2.3 Vulnerability of Prior Wear-Leveling Schemes
Unlike the techniques described in Section 2.2, wear-leveling schemes extend the lifetime of PRAM by evenly distributing the
locally concentrated writes across the entire PRAM space. Transparent to the users, these techniques periodically change the
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mapping between the physical address and the physical PRAM location. Although such periodic mapping schemes can reduce the
system’s vulnerability to brute-force type of attacks, they are still vulnerable to deliberately-designed attacks, especially when the
OS is compromised, as we will discuss in the following sections.
2.3.1 Row Shifting and Segment Swapping
Zhou et al. [22] proposed an integrated wear-leveling mechanism with two techniques: a fine-grained wear-leveling called Row
Shifting and a coarse-grained one called Segment Swapping. Row Shifting rotates a physical PRAM row one byte at a time for a
given shift interval based on the number of writes to the row. On the other hand, the Segment Swapping scheme swaps the most
frequently written segment with one of the less frequently written segments by monitoring the number of writes to each segment.
A segment (1MB) contains several rows (32KB). Nevertheless, this wear-leveling has two main drawbacks: the overhead of a
hardware address mapping table and a sorting network required for picking a less frequently written segment, both preventing the
use of small segments. Thus, authors used a large 1MB segment [22].
Unfortunately, such a coarse-grained segment allows an adversary to fail a system easily. For example, if the OS has already
been compromised (e.g., via buffer overflow), an attacker can allocate all the first physical pages of each of the 1MB PRAM
segments to the malicious program. Once the malicious program can access these 16K pages, it can execute a loop that writes the
first byte of these pages one by one. Once the malicious program iterates this loop n times where n is the row shift interval, it
should write the second byte of these pages (instead of the first byte) to attack the same physical cells even after a row is shifted.
The attacker can continue such attack until PRAM cells fail. Note that an attacker can also wear out these 16K pages in parallel
using a distributed attack model with multiple threads on a multi-core processor [19]. This means that overall execution time of this
process will be eventually limited by the bank-level parallelism of PRAM, not by computation. Consequently, a group of PRAM
cells will fail after the following period:
2 × # of segments × (line-fill latency + write-back latency)# of possible writes in parallel × PRAM write endurance
where 2 accounts for the worst-case latency due to potentially unsynchronized rotation between the malicious code and actual
hardware. For a system with 16 GB 16-bank PRAM, PRAM cells will fail within 2048 minutes.
2.3.2 Randomized Region Based Start-Gap
In contrast to a table-based translation scheme, Qureshi et al. proposed Randomized Region Based Start-Gap (randomized RBSG)
wear-leveling method by using an algebraic mapping between physical addresses and memory addresses [14]. As shown in Fig-
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Figure 3: An Example of RBSG Translation for One Rotation Phase
ure 2(a) and (b), a physical address issued from the cache is translated into an intermediate address by an Address-Space Randomiza-
tion method based on Feistel Network or a Random Invertible Binary Matrix. It is noteworthy to point out that their randomization
function is only updated once when the system is booted.
Furthermore, the intermediate address space is partitioned into several segments called RBSG regions. There is an extra storage
line allocated for each RBSG region. In addition, there is a Gap pointer pointing to an empty line and a Start pointer pointing to
the line with the lowest physical address in the region. Within an RBSG region, RBSG region offset bits (Figure 2(b)) are further
translated using another algebraic function called Region Based Start-Gap (RBSG). Figure 3 illustrates an example of RBSG
translation. In this example, one RBSG region contains eight memory lines across multiple banks. When the number of writes
in this region exceeds a certain threshold, ψ, indicated by an overflowed write counter, the line (H) adjacent to the Gap pointer
in this region is shifted into the extra space while the Gap pointer will point to where the migrated line used to be (Figure 3(b)).
Once the write counter overflows again, the line (G) adjacent to the Gap pointer is shifted following the same direction to the
empty space. Afterward, the Gap points to the empty slot. (Figure 3(c)). Such migration continues for every ψ and finally reaches
the state in Figure 3(d) when all eight memory lines are rotated by one from the initial state (Figure 3(a)). The Start pointer is
updated to indicate the current PRAM location of the lowest physical address (A) in this RBSG region. This RBSG scheme enables
wear-leveling without having a large table.
However, we found that a deliberately-contrived malicious program can still fail such systems easily by exploiting side channels














































Figure 4: An Attack Model for RBSG
once booted, (2) the migration of their scheme performs linear shifting, which is deterministic. How a malicious process identifies
consecutive physical addresses in a region is shown below.
Step 1: Finding a set of physical addresses mapped to the same bank. To find these addresses, we first pick an arbitrary
physical address b0. For every memory line ax, we apply timing attacks [6] to see if b0 is in the same bank of an ax. The rationale
is simple— if the measured data access time to two back-to-back accesses a1 and b0 is longer than that to access a2 and b0, we
can conclude a1 and b0 are located within the same bank but at different rows indicated by a row miss (Figure 4(a)). Note that, a
compromised OS can schedule only the malicious process to perform such profiling. Using this attack, we find all the lines from
the same bank with b0 but at different rows. We call this set of memory lines T0.
Step 2: Finding a set of physical addresses mapped to the same row. To find these physical addresses, we first pick another
arbitrary physical address, b1(6= b0) from T0. Then, we apply the same timing attack in Step 1 by accessing one address ax from
T0 with b1 at a time. We iterate through all the addresses in T0 during this attack. For those (ax, b1) pairs responding faster (a3 and
b1 reside in the same row buffer in Figure 4(b)), they must be located in the same row. We call this set of physical addresses T1.
Step 3: Finding the location ordering of physical addresses on the same row in T1. We infer the physical layout by
exploiting the rotation pattern of RBSG. As explained previously, one rotation phase is completed every {(# of memory lines in an
RBSG region) + 1} × ψ. In the meantime, a memory line of each row of a PRAM bank has been moved to another bank. For
example, a memory line v0 in a row of Bank 0 has been moved to the same row of Bank 1 (Figure 4(c)). To find v0, we can use the
same timing attack loop. This time, the candidate line ax is selected from T1 to pair up with a b2 arbitrarily chosen from T0 ∩ T c1 .1
If the response time of an (ax, b2) pair is shorter, it implies ax, i.e., v0 in our example, has been migrated to another bank. We
apply the above attack for every rotation phase using the same b2 (Figure 4(d) shows the status after the second rotation phase). As
such, the next adjacent address (v1) to the previously migrated line (v0) can be identified in each phase. We perform this iteration
by n times, where n is the required iteration count to fail a PRAM line and will be varied for different machine configurations.





is the formal notation of the complementary set of T1 used in set theory.
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section. For each iteration, the physical memory address of the T1 row moved to the next bank will be appended to an ordered list,
V (e.g., V = (v0, v1) in Figure 4(d).)
Step 4: Finding one physical address migrated to the same bank (in Step 3) but at a different row. The fourth step is to
find a memory line in T0 ∩ T c1 that was moved to the next bank due to rotation caused by Step 3 (e.g., r0 in Figure 4(e)). To find
this line, we use one element of V as a reference point and find a memory line that generates row buffer misses in the new bank.
We call this memory line r0.
Step 5: Attacking specific PRAM lines. The final step is to fail PRAM lines by repeatedly writing data based on the order of
the lines in the new bank. Note that RBSG rotates all lines by one position at a time for each rotation phase. If we keep writing
data to the first element (v0) of V within the same phase (Figure 4(f)), after one rotation phase, the second element of V (v1) will
be rotated to the PRAM line previously occupied by v0 (Figure 4(g)). Based on this writing patterns, a malicious code will be able
to track and wear out the target PRAM line. To avoid these writes hitting in the row buffer, we also need to load data from r0
alternately.
Now, the remaining question is how long the ordered list, V , should be, or the value of n in Step 3. To calculate this number,
we use values suggested by the original paper [14] and assume each RBSG region contains 219 lines (128MB, line size=256B) with
a PRAM write endurance of 108 times and a ψ threshold of 100 writes. Consequently, a rotation in one RBSG region is triggered
upon 100×( 128MB256B +1) = 52428900 writes. Stochastically, four consecutive physical memory line addresses (d
108
0.5×52428900e = 4)
will be sufficient to wear out PRAM.
To estimate how fast an adversary can succeed, we have developed analytical models but we will not elaborate them due to space
limit. In short, Step 1, Step 2, Step 32, and Step 4 take 80.5 seconds, 5.0 seconds, 125.8 seconds, and 5.0 seconds, respectively.
A compromised OS can schedule the malicious process for four minutes to identify one target ordered list. Once it is revealed, it
takes less than 30 minutes to wear out PRAM. Note that, during Step 5, the OS can continue to run other processes so long as the
entire victim RBSG region is dedicated to the malicious thread.
3 Security Refresh
As mentioned earlier, prior studies mainly focused on extending the lifetime of a PRAM-based system running conventional
applications but failed to protect the system against deliberately-crafted malicious attacks. A malicious application can exploit the
properties of a durability solution to destruct a PRAM portion easily. Although durability and security seem to be two separate
2When we calculate the attack time of Step 3 and Step 5, we also considered a write buffer and the delayed write policy [14].
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issues in PRAM design, they share a common goal and should be addressed at the same time. In this paper, we argue that a correct,
usable PRAM design should consider the worst-case wear-out under malicious attacks such as side channel exploits to make PRAM
commercially viable. In general, if PRAM can sustain malicious attacks, they should simultaneously address the durability issue.
To circumvent these intentional exploits, we must keep adversaries from inferring an actual physical PRAM location. Furthermore,
the address space must be shuffled dynamically over time to avoid useful information leaked through side-channels.
3.1 Security Refresh Controller
First, we define one more address space, the Refreshed or Remapped Memory Address (RMA), inside a PRAM chip to dissociate a
memory address (MA) (defined in Figure 1) from the actual data location. After receiving an access command from the memory
controller, each PRAM chip re-calculates its own internal bank, row, and column address. Similar to DRAM refresh preventing
charge leaking from a DRAM cell, in this work, we propose Security Refresh to prevent address information leaked from PRAM
accesses. Rather than refreshing based on time in DRAM cell, our Security Refresh scheme refreshes a PRAM region based on
usage, i.e., the number of writes. Our Security Refresh is controlled by Security Refresh Controller (SRC), which is embedded
inside the PRAM chip. The SRC not only remaps an MA into an RMA but also periodically changes the mapping between these
two address domains with extremely low-overhead hardware. The rationale and advantages of employing an SRC inside a PRAM
chip are:
• To obfuscate the address information regarding the actual physical data placement from applications, the (compromised) OS,
and the memory controller.
• To obfuscate potential side-channel leakage, if any.
• To prohibit any physical tampering, e.g., memory bus probing.
• To provide high efficiency without disturbing the off-chip bus during data shuffling and swapping.
• To enable a high-bandwidth data swapping mechanism without being constrained by limited, off-chip pin bandwidth.
3.2 Basics of Distributed Security Refresh
Since our proposed SRC will be implemented inside each PRAM chip that will likely be manufactured with a process optimized
for PRAM cell density, the hardware overhead for the SRC should be kept low to make it practical. Furthermore, as demonstrated
previously, information can leak through side channels. A sufficient amount of such information allows an adversary to assemble




























































































(b) Security Refresh Rate and Round










































































































































































Figure 6: An Example of One Complete Security Refresh Round
will not address this issue properly. Thus, we need to constantly update the address mapping to obfuscate any relationship among
information leaked from side channels.
Before explaining our algorithm, we first introduce our nomenclature in Figure 5. As shown in Figure 5(a), a PRAM bank is
composed of several memory regions, each region contains many memory blocks (four in the figure). A memory block should
be no smaller than a cache line in order to keep address lookup simple. For every r writes (r = 2 in Figure 5(b)), the SRC will
“refresh” a memory block by potentially remapping it to a new PRAM location using a randomly generated key and our algorithm
to be described in Section 3.3.3 We call this number of writes, r, the security refresh rate analogous to DRAM’s refresh rate. The
refresh operations continue for all memory blocks in each region. A complete iteration of remapping every single memory block in
a region is called a security refresh round, similar to DRAM’s refresh time. To begin another security refresh round, a new random
key will be generated and used together with the key from its previous refresh round.
3.3 Security Refresh Algorithm
Now we use an example to walk through our algorithm followed by its formal definition and description. Figure 6 depicts an
example of one security refresh round. From Figure 6(a) to (e), we start from an initial state with eight successive security
refreshes for eight memory blocks in one PRAM region. In each subfigure, the left column shows MAs (memory addresses) of
these blocks with their data in capital letters while the right column shows the RMAs (refreshed memory addresses) and the actual
3We differentiate these two terms: refresh and remapping. A refresh will be evaluated upon the due of a security refresh rate, however, as we will show later, it
may or may not lead to an address remapping in PRAM space.
11
data placement in PRAM. We explain each subfigure in the following.
1. Figure 6(a) shows the initial state in which all eight RMAs were generated by XORing their corresponding MAs with a key
k0 where k0 = 4. For example, the memory address MA0 (000) XOR k0 (100) is mapped to RMA4 (100) in the physical
PRAM. Also note that, Figure 6(a) has reached the end of a security refresh round as all the MAs have been refreshed with
k0. Upon each security refresh, the candidate MA to be refreshed is pointed by a register called Current Refresh Pointer
(CRP) shown as a shaded box in the figure. The CRP is incremented after each security refresh.
2. Upon the next security refresh (Figure 6(b)), a new security refresh round will be initiated because CRP has reached the first
MA of a region. Consequently, a new key (k1 = 6) will be generated by a hardware random number generator in the SRC
for refreshing all MAs in the current round. At this point, MA0 is refreshed and remapped from RMA4 to RMA6. Since the
data (A) of MA0 is now moved to RMA6 where the data (C) of MA2 used to be. Hence, C should be evicted from RMA4
and stored somewhere else. Interestingly, due to the nature of XOR, MA2 will actually be mapped to RMA4 using the new
key (2⊕ k1 = 4), i.e., the RMA of MA0 from the previous round (0⊕ k0 = 4). This security refresh, essentially, swaps data
between MA0 and MA2 in their PRAM locations. We call this interesting property the pairwise remapping property, which
will be defined and proved formally later. Note that the SRC will be responsible for reading and writing two memory blocks
to physically swap the data between them.
3. Similarly, in the next security refresh (Figure 6(c)), data for MA1 and MA3 (a victim evicted by MA1) in PRAM are swapped
between RMA5 and RMA7.
4. In Figure 6(d), MA2 pointed by CRP is supposed to be remapped after its security refresh. However, it has been swapped
previously (Figure 6(b)) in the current security refresh round. Thus, we will not swap again but simply increment the CRP
pointer. To test whether an MA has already been swapped in the current round can easily be done by exploiting the pairwise
remapping property. All we need to do is to XOR the current candidate MA with the key used in the prior refresh round and
the key used in the current round. If the outcome is smaller than CRP, it indicates the memory block has been swapped in the
current round. For instance in Figure 6(d), we XOR MA2 with 4 (k0) and 6 (k1) giving a result of 0 (2 ⊕ 4 ⊕ 6 = 0). Since
it is smaller than CRP (=2), it indicates that MA2 has been swapped in the current refresh round. We will show the formal
proof later in this section.
5. The next five memory blocks are refreshed in the same manner. After the eighth security refresh in the current round, CRP
will wrap around and reach MA0 again, completing the current security refresh round. (Figure 6(e)). Upon the next refresh,
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Table 1: Notations Used in the Proof
kp A previous key generated in the previous security refresh round kc A current key generated in the current security refresh round
Am An MA to be refreshed in the current refresh
Arp An RMA to which Am was mapped with kp (i.e., Arp = Am ⊕ kp) Arc An RMA to which Am will be mapped with kc (i.e., Arc = Am ⊕ kc)
Bm An MA mapped to Arc with kp, thus to be evicted by Am
Brp An RMA to which Bm was mapped with kp (i.e., Brp = Bm ⊕ kp) Brc An RMA to which Bm will be mapped with kc (i.e., Brc = Bm ⊕ kc)
a new key, k2, will be generated and a new round starts using k1 and k2. k0 will no longer be needed. Note that, for each
refresh round, only the most recent two keys are needed.
Now, we formally explain the pairwise remapping property, which allows us to exchange a pair of memory blocks only with
two keys. For our address remapping, assume that we use a binary operation, ⊕, closed on a set S, which satisfies the following
properties for all x, y, and z,the elements of S, where S is a set of possible addresses in a PRAM region.
• Associative Property: (x⊕ y) ⊕ z = x⊕ (y ⊕ z).
• Commutative Property: x⊕ y = y ⊕ x.
• Self-Inverse Property: x⊕ x = e, where e is an identity element so that x⊕ e = x.
Basically, we find an RMA for a given MA by simply performing this binary operation between MA and a randomly generated
key (k) of the same length i.e., MA⊕ k = RMA. Here, we define several notations used in this proof as shown in Table 1.
According to associative and self-inverse properties, when Am newly occupies Arc , Bm can be easily detected by performing
⊕ operation between Arc and kp because Arc ⊕ kp = (Bm ⊕ kp) ⊕ kp = Bm. More interestingly, the new location (Brc) that
Bm should be mapped to with kc is the old location (Arp) that Am used to be mapped to with kp because Brc = Bm ⊕ kc =
(Arc ⊕ kp)⊕ kc = ((Am ⊕ kc)⊕ kp)⊕ kc = Am ⊕ kp = Arp . In short, we can simultaneously map a pair of MAs into their new
RMA locations by simply swapping the physical data of their old PRAM blocks. Consequently, the actual swapping operations
in a security refresh round will be done by one half of all security refresh operations. The simplest function that satisfies all three
properties is an eXclusive-OR although we have proved that any function satisfying the above three properties can be used as the
refresh/remapping function. For the rest of this paper, we use XOR.
3.4 Obtaining the Key for Address Translation
To correctly find the data location in PRAM, we need to translate the given MA to its current RMA using the right key. It seems
that the most straightforward way to find the right key is to add one bit in SRC for each MA to indicate whether it needs to be
translated using the key in previous refresh round or the current key. Even though 1-bit per block seems small, for a 1GB PRAM
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region with 16KB memory blocks, we will need 8KB (=216 bits) extra space. In fact, hardware overhead for maintaining translation
information of each block is the main reason why the prior table-based approach [22] cannot support fine-granularity segments.
Fortunately, in our scheme, the pairwise remapping property along with the use of the linearly increasing CRP value property
allow us to determine the right key without any extra table. In particular, when a memory controller wants to read from or write
to an MA Cm, we need to use the current key (kc) in the following two cases, otherwise, the key in previous refresh round (kp)
should be used.
• If Cm is less than the value of CRP, we should use the current key (kc) since Cm has already been refreshed in the current
security refresh round.
• if Cm ⊕ kp ⊕ kc is less than the value of CRP, we should use the current key, too This is not very intuitive, so we will describe
it with a formal method. What we want to detect in this condition is whether Cm was a victim that is evicted when another
MA, Dm, is remapped to the old RMA value of Cm, i.e., Cm ⊕ kp. As explained in Section 3.3, we can reconstruct Dm by
simply performing an XOR operation between the RMA value and the current key, which is (Cm ⊕ kp) ⊕ kc. If we compare
Dm against the value of CRP, we can detect whether Cm was a victim that is already remapped when Dm was remapped.
A hardware illustration of the actual MA-to-RMA address translation in PRAM is depicted in Figure 7(b).
3.5 Hardware Design for Security Refresh Controller
The main additional hardware for supporting Security Refresh is the Security Refresh Controller (SRC) (Figure 7(a)) per region.
Each SRC consists of four registers, a random key generator (RKG), address translation logic (ATL), remapping checker (RC),
and data swapping logic (DSL). The four registers required are: (1) KEY0 register to store a prior key (log2 n bit where n is the
number of memory blocks in a region), (2) KEY1 register to store a current key, (3) a global write counter (GWC) to count the total
number of writes to a region for triggering security refresh, and (4) the current refresh pointer (CRP) that points to the next MA to
be refreshed. A new key is generated by RKG in-between two security refresh rounds using thermal noise generated by undriven
resistors in the SRC [5]. These keys can never be accessed or leave outside the PRAM chip.
The ATL (Figure 7(b)) performs address translation. It essentially maps an MA from the memory controller to a corresponding
RMA. The detailed algorithm was explained and proved in Section 3.4. As explained earlier, the translation process needs to
understand whether a given MA has been remapped in the current round. This algorithm is implemented in the RC (Figure 7(c)),
which consists of only two bitwise XOR gates, two comparators, and one OR gate. Additionally, the RC is also responsible for







(K E Y 0)
K ey1 register
















(a) Secure Refresh Controller
0 1




R MA old R MAnew
R MA
(b) ATL
< CR P < CR P
K E Y 0 K E Y 1
A lready
remapped
MA (for A T L ) or






K E Y 0 K E Y 1
CR P
R MAold R MAnew
R MA old R MAnew
(d) DSL
Figure 7: Secure Refresh Controller
DSL can decide whether the MA should be remapped or not.
3.6 Memory Controller Design Issues
In a conventional DRAM-based system, a memory controller understands whether a given memory request will hit in a row buffer
or not. Consequently, it can schedule its commands so that the return data of those commands will not conflict in a memory bus.
However, in our proposed PRAM system that obfuscates internal address information, the memory controller cannot schedule the
external PRAM bus alone like a conventional DRAM memory controller. To utilize the bus more efficiently, we envision that future
PRAM chips should be actively involved in bus arbitration. For example, a PRAM chip can send a data ready signal to the memory
controller once the requested data are brought into a row buffer. Based on this ready signal, the memory controller can utilize the
bus more intelligently. However, detailed PRAM memory controller design issues are outside of the scope of this paper.
4 Implementation Trade-off of Security Refresh
So far, we have discussed how Security Refresh works and its advantage from the standpoint of malicious wear-out. However,
there are design trade-offs in the PRAM design. For example, if the total number of writes required to start a new security
refresh round is larger than the PRAM write endurance limit, an adversary could wear a PRAM block out before a new refresh
round is triggered (robustness). On the other hand, extra PRAM writes are induced due to swapping during refresh. Frequent
swaps may unnecessarily increase the total number of PRAM writes even for normal applications (write overhead), leading to
performance degradation (performance penalty). Thus, we must carefully consider the implementation style of refresh with
PRAM organization parameters to maximize its robustness while minimizing the write overheads and its performance penalty. To
quantify the trade-off, we developed analytical models to estimate robustness and write overhead. In our model, we made following
observations:
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1. A larger region will distribute localized writes across a larger space.
2. A large region requires a smaller refresh rate to increase the frequency of randomized mapping changes. Otherwise, if one
refresh round is too long, it may inadvertently leave a mapping unchanged for too long as well, making potential side channel
attacks possible.
3. A smaller refresh rate will, nonetheless, inflict high write overhead due to its more frequent swapping, which can lead to
higher performance penalty.
Given the first observation, we first evaluated a region size as large as a PRAM bank (Figure 8(a)). (The reason why we did
not evaluate multiple banks in a PRAM chip as a region is to allow a memory controller to exploit bank-level parallelism for better
scheduling.) As we will show later and also explained in our second and third observations, we found that the write overhead of a
bank-sized region is too high.
To take the advantage of a large region size, we proposed and evaluated a hierarchical, two-level Security Refresh scheme as
shown in Figure 8(b). In lieu of using a very small refresh rate that increases write overheads, we break up a region in several,
smaller sub-regions. Each sub-region contains its own SRC to perform address remapping within itself based on the inner-level
refresh rate. To distribute writes across the entire region, an outer-level SRC is used with a larger refresh rate. As such, memory
blocks will be refreshed and remapped inside each sub-region more frequently than the refresh and remap taken place between
blocks across different sub-regions.
In this two-level scheme, a refresh can be triggered at both levels. The outer-level SRC keeps track of all the number of writes
received and refresh memory blocks across the entire region. Such refresh will swap memory blocks across different sub-regions.
On the other hand, each inner-level sub-region SRC only tracks the writes within its own sub-region and triggers refresh operations
using its own refresh rate. A refresh triggered by an inner-level SRC will only swap memory blocks within its own sub-region.
During data lookup, the given MA will first be translated by the outer-level SRC into an intermediate RMA. This RMA will then
be forwarded to its corresponding inner-level sub-region SRC for another translation to find its actual location. We now detail the
analytical models of these two different schemes.
4.1 Single-Level Security Refresh
To calculate how robust our system is, we estimate the number of security refresh rounds a system can sustain before one PRAM
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Figure 8: One-Level vs. Two-Level Security Refresh (Four Ranks, Four Banks per Rank)
where R is the size of a PRAM region, b is the size of a memory block, and r is the security refresh rate. So, in the worst-case
(which occurs when the victim line is swapped as the last pair during a refresh round), one physical cell can be written by R
b
× r
times in the first refresh round. In the next refresh round, the probability of mapping the victim MA to the same RMA as the first
security refresh round with a true random key is b
R
. In other words, the number of writes that can be mapped to the same PRAM
cell (as the first refresh round) over n refresh rounds is ( R
b
× r) × {1 + (n − 1) × b
R
} where n > 1. In addition to these demand
writes, a victim PRAM cell is also written to once during swapping for every refresh round. Thus, for n refresh rounds, the victim
PRAM cell can be written by (R
b
× r) × {1 + (n− 1) × b
R
} + n times. Here, we assume that the PRAM endurance limit, Wmax,




r+1 . In other words, our







× r) writes across its PRAM cells before one bit is failed. We call this
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Figure 9: Single-Level Robustness
As shown from this analysis, the design trade-off of Security Refresh is a multi-
dimensional function ofR, b, and r. In this evaluation, we assume a 1GB logical bank
(or 512Mb PRAM array over 16 x4 chips4). Figure 9 shows that swapping a 256B
memory block every 4 writes is optimal in terms of robustness in this configuration,
which makes the PRAM memory endure up to 2.79 × 1014 writes. Conservatively
assuming that the latency of one write attack is just a sum of one PRAM write latency
(for write) and one PRAM read latency (for row buffer miss), this system can sustain
a single cell attack for 5.31 years. The 5.31 year is longer than the current average server’s replacement cycle of three to four
years [12, 11].
Next, we compared our results with a perfect wear-leveling scheme. In a perfect wear-leveling scheme, 1GB PRAM mem-
4Our remapping does not require communication among these chips because our memory block is larger than the bus width and is aligned with it.
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ory (222 memory blocks) can endure 222 × Wmax writes, therefore, our Security Refresh technique achieves 66.6% (= 2.79 ×
1014/(222 ×Wmax)) of the perfectly even distribution model. We analyzed this gap in detail with other models (not shown due
to space limit), and found that the 33.4% gap is contributed by the additional writes of the victim cell for swapping (16.6%) and
the non-instant (distributed) update (16.8%). Clearly, the overhead of remapping and non-instant update affected the robustness of
bank-level Security Refresh seriously. On the other hand, the total number of writes increased due to remapping is 20% due to our
low refresh rate (= 4 writes).
4.2 Two-Level Security Refresh
For the two-level Security Refresh scheme, we use a hierarchical approach to model the robustness. For the inner-level refresh, we
can just use the analytical model presented in the previous section. The difference is that malicious writes to attack a sub-region
will be evenly distributed by the outer-level Security Refresh. Therefore, the required number of writes to wear out a bit in a sub-








× ri). Similar to what we did for the single-level
Security Refresh, here we also estimate the number of outer refresh rounds a system can sustain before the number of writes to the
victim sub-region exceeds the Attack Endurance of the victim sub-region. Here, we assume that k outer-level refresh rounds are
needed to reach AEi.
In the outer Security Refresh, one outer refresh round requires Ro
Bo
× ro writes where Ro, Bo, and ro are the size of the outer-
level region (a bank), the size of outer-level memory block, and the outer security refresh rate, respectively. As we have calculated
previously, we can model the number of writes that can be mapped to the same sub-region over k outer refresh rounds to be
(Ro
Bo
× ro) × {1 + (k − 1) ×
Ri
Ro
} (k > 1). Additionally, k outer-level refresh rounds generate k × Ro
Bo
writes for swapping, which
can be mapped to the victim sub-region with the probability of Ri
Ro
. Because we assumed that AEi is reached after k outer-level
refresh rounds ( (Ro
Bo
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Figure 10: Two-Level Robustness
This analysis is even more complicated as we have six input values. We
iteratively searched a configuration that can sustain the longest and found
that the robustness is more sensitive to three input values of the inner-level
Security Refresh than the same inputs of the outer-level. And we found that
the smaller a memory block is, the longer the system can sustain because
a smaller memory block allows us to distribute malicious wear-outs more
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evenly. Thus, here we only show the sensitivity of robustness with respect
to only two input values, the size of sub-region and the inner refresh rate.
Figure 10 shows the lifetime of a two-level Security Refresh scheme with 1GB bank, an outer-level refresh rate of 2048, and 256B
block for both levels). Here, x-axis plots different inner-level refresh rate, and different curves vary the sizes of a sub-region. As
shown in the figure, when we use two-level Security Refresh, the system can sustain against malicious wear-outs almost up to
8 years. Furthermore, an optimal refresh rate is a lot higher than that of a single-level Security Refresh, resulting in less write
overhead and less performance overhead. It says, by adopting a smaller region at the inner level, we can more frequently migrate a
memory block even with a higher refresh rate. Furthermore, an outer level Security Refresh often swaps memory blocks over a lot
larger space, which addresses the problem of smaller region size of the inner-level Security Refresh.
5 Evaluation
5.1 Wear-leveling
In this section, we analyze the wear-out distribution of our Security Refresh under a pinpoint attack that writes to one single logical
non-cacheable address by toggling its data bits. As analyzed earlier, we show that it is impossible within a reasonable amount of
time for an adversary to track, target, and attack a specific PRAM line of a system using Security Refresh. Therefore, here we use
such a known, worst-case pinpoint attack to demonstrate and analyze the wear-out behavior. To count the number of writes for
each memory block, we use PIN [10], a dynamic instrumentation tool. In this simulation, we use the two-level Security Refresh
scheme described in Section 4.2. We assume the PRAM has four 1GB banks and each bank is divided into 32 subregions. We use
the same memory block size (256B) for both the bank level and the subregion level. The security refresh rate for the bank level
is 2048 writes. To study the sensitivity of inner-level refresh rates, we use 3 different inner-level refresh rates — 16, 32, and 64
writes.
Figure 11 shows the accumulated number of writes (including swap write overhead in our scheme) for two pinpoint attacks; one
writes to the same physical address (134518272) 108 times while the other writes 1011 times. As shown in Figure 11(a), without
any wear-leveling scheme, all 108 writes hit the same location, increasing the likelihood of its failure in the future. However, with
our two-level Security Refresh, these writes are dispersed across the entire memory space. The more linear trajectory of a stepping
curve in the figure, the more evenly distributed the writes are. Based on this, as shown in Figure 11(a), we found that a finer-grained
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Figure 11: Accumulated number of writes according to the frequency of the pinpoint attack


























Figure 12: Consumed Lifetime for Pinpoint Attacks
The figures also show how many writes are increased due
to the swap operations during refreshes. For example, in Fig-
ure 11(a) the difference between the final accumulated number
(on the right) and 108 tick on y-axis represents the extra writes
contributed by swap operations. The percentage increase of
writes for the three inner-level refresh rates are 6.4%, 3.3%
and 1.7%, respectively. It implies that a shorter security refresh
rate may incur more performance degradation. Their impact to
performance will be analyzed in Section 5.2.
Now we analyze the lifetime impact of pinpoint attacks. Figure 12 shows the wear-out percentage of a memory block for four
pinpoint attacks. It is obvious that a system without protection can be completely worn out by simply writing 108 times to the same
block. In contrast, the percentages drop down to 4.0%, 8.0%, and 13.0% using our two-level Security Refresh with refresh rates of
16, 32, and 64. More interestingly, with the number of pinpoint attacks increased exponentially, the wear-out percentage was only
increased marginally, showing the effectiveness of our Security Refresh scheme against pinpoint attacks.
5.2 Performance Impact
We evaluate the performance of our Security Refresh scheme using SESC[15] with 26 SPEC2006 benchmark programs. Similar






































































































































































Figure 13: Relative IPC for the change of the bank level swap interval
controller exploiting bank-level parallelism and arbitrating requests to improve PRAM row buffer hits. We used a two-level Security
Refresh scheme with the same configuration in Section 5.1 to compare against a baseline without any wear-leveling technique.
As shown in Figure 13, the performance of most of the benchmark programs were almost unchanged with our Security Refresh
for the three inner-level refresh rates experimented. The geometric means of IPC variations are −1.4%, −0.4%, and +0.2%,
respectively. They follow the trend of our probabilistic estimates for the write increases due to swapping: 6.3%, 3.2%, and 1.6%.
Besides write overheads that degrades performance, we found that the row hit rates can be improved in some circumstances. In
fact, the address space randomization may improve temporal locality of memory blocks. It is because the technique distributes
memory blocks to different banks, increasing the likelihood of row buffer hits as each bank has its own row buffer. In our analysis,
we found the average increase of PRAM row hit rates is from 3.3% ∼ 3.5%.
For example, 410.bwaves receives the most benefit (2.1% ∼ 3.6%) from the improved row buffer hit rate (7.56% ∼ 7.62%).
462.libquantum is the only benchmark showing a decreased row hit rate (−1.1% ∼ −0.3%) but at the noise level. Overall, the
performance impact with our Security Refresh scheme is negligible.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that a robust PRAM design must take both security and durability issues into account simultaneously. More
importantly, it must be able to circumvent the scenarios of intentional, malicious attacks with the presence of a compromised OS
and potential information leak from side channels. By analyzing prior durability techniques at architectural level, we demonstrated
practical attacking models, including deliberately contrived methods exploiting side channels, can wear out PRAM blocks within
a tangible amount of time. For example, prior redundant write reduction techniques do not obfuscate addresses, making a victim
memory block easy to target. Some wear-leveling technique performs address randomization, however, the mapping was static at
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boot time, leaving open side channels for adversaries to glean and assemble useful information.
To address these shortcomings, we propose Security Refresh, a novel, low-cost hardware-based wear-leveling scheme that per-
forms dynamic randomization for placing PRAM data. Security Refresh relies on an embedded controller inside each PRAM to
prevent adversaries from tampering the bus interface or aggregating meaningful information via side channels. Furthermore, we
evaluated the implementation trade-off of Security Refresh and quantified the reliability for a two-level Security Refresh mecha-
nism. Given a 1GB PRAM bank with 32 sub-regions at the inner-level, its optimal lifetime (8 years) can be achieved with a 256B
memory block using 2048 and 32 writes for the outer- and inner-level refresh rates.
In addition, we also apply simple pinpoint attacks to understand the wear-out distribution using Security Refresh. We found
that as the number of pinpoint writes to the same memory address is increased, our technique will distribute the data placement
more evenly, improving the overall durability. Finally, we analyzed the performance impact of Security Refresh using SPEC2006
and found the average IPC variations are within 2%.
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